Ethical responsibility and the historian: On the possible end of a history "of a certain kind"

Abstract
In this article I try to answer the question posed by History and Theory's "call for papers"; namely, "do historians as historians have an ethical responsibility, and if so to whom and to what?" To do this I draw mainly (but not exclusively and somewhat unevenly) on three texts: Alain Badiou's Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, J. F. Lyotard's The Differend, and Edward Said's Representations of the Intellectual; Jacques Derrida and Richard Rorty have a presence too, albeit a largely absent one. Together, I argue that these theorists (intellectuals) enable me to draw a portrait of an ethically responsible intellectual. I then consider whether historians qua historians have-some kind of ethical responsibility-to somebody or to something-over and above that of the intellectual qua, intellectual; I reply negatively. And this negative reply has implications for historians. For if historians are to be intellectuals of the type I outline here, then they must end their present practices insofar as they do not fulfill the criteria for the type of ethical responsibility I have argued for. Consequently, to be "ethical" in the way suggested perhaps signals-as the subtitle of my paper suggests-the possible end of a history "of a certain kind" and, as the inevitable corollary, the end of a historian "of a certain kind" too.