Abstract
An account of debates surrounding "Verstehen" which begins with Dilthey, focuses on Husserl and Heidegger, and criticizes a broad range of contemporary theorists including Hayden White and David Hoy. Johnson argues that the "Verstehen" constitutive of social action has an irreducible "narrative" component (in that it entails "past‑referring assumptions") which is normally taken for granted by actors. In hermeneutical encounters with "past actions" Johnson believes that it is vital to maintain a distinction between "genuine other‑referring understanding" and an "interpretation encrusted and entrenched within one's own horizon." This is a distinction between the other's genuine narrative which is "understanding" (only attainable by taking "the action or text on its own terms") and narratives we attribute to past actions which go beyond the proper "limits" of the other's understanding and merely illuminate our own world. Johnson argues that by looking for narratives in "past actions" which are "public " ‑‑ narratives which are implicit in characters' actions but were normally not "present" to consciousness ‑‑ rather than mistakenly trying to locate narratives in the "private" conscious beliefs of past actors through "empathy," we will have a basis for overcoming the temptation to think it is impossible to distinguish between genuine "understanding" and mere "interpretation." Though he stresses the importance of maintaining this philosophical distinction, Johnson admits that these "limits" must be determined on a "case by case" basis and he confines himself to the practical advice that one ought to get to know the "community" in which past actions took place in depth before claiming to have "understanding." (David Hennigan) (Abstract via Allan Megill)