Narrative Form as a Cognitive Instrument

Suggest that the concept of narrative form raises problems that deserve attention. (By narrative, Mink appears to mean simply the historical account; and by form, the structure of that account. He does not deploy a distinction between narrative and non‑narrative history.)
Firstly, historical "narratives" should aggregate, since each claims to be true about "a selected segment of past actuality"; yet in fact they do not.
Secondly, there is a problem about the truth of narrative. Analytic philosphers have treated narrative as if it were just a conjunction of discrete, past‑referring statements, but such a notion is appropriate only to chronicle and not to narrative. Thirdly, the concept of an "event" is unclear. For example, in the Renaissance an event ? Further, we cannot refer to events as such, but only to events "under a description." Thus there can be more than one description of the same event. But what can we mean, then, by "the same event"? According to Mink, the concept of event is "primarily linked to the conceptual structure of science," within which it is "purged of all narrative connections." Thus the concept of a "narrative of events" seems almost a contradiction in terms. (195‑201)
"[A] narrative cannot be . . . restated as an inventory of conclusions or 'findings.' . . . The cognitive function of narrative form . . . is not just to relate a succession of events but to body forth an ensemble of interrelationships of many different kinds or a single whole (Abstract via Allan Megill)