In this article I examine the gap that exists between an individual's self-identity in a given situation and the later appropriation of that identity in any political programme aimed at changing situations. I will argue that an individual's performance of the self constitutes the first stage in the transition from a 'self' to an 'identity' as represented in narrative accounts constructed by, for example, historians. To better understand this transition, I discuss briefly the levels involved using the example of Jean-Paul Sartre's biography of Gustave Flaubert. The account serves as an extreme illustration of a performance of self. In it, Sartre demonstrates how Flaubert's consciousness of others leads him away from authentic actions. Even at this early stage in his socialization, Flaubert is, Sartre argues, already 'inhabited by the imperatives he has given to himself as other.' The further appropriation of a self-presentation for purposes of identity politics as carried out by some biographers, for example brings with it another, expressly ethical (as opposed to epistemiological), question. Similarly to the conflict existing in a subject's narration of his or her identity, I argue that there is an inherent conflict regarding authentic representation within narrative accounts. From this vantage, the concept of identity in the hands of identity politics, presents us not with a tool for understanding past agents or even past communities but rather a means to reflect on our communal present. Yet this begs the question: How can use of the concept of identity be justified in emancipatory politics? What value can a represented identity have in possible emancipatory struggles if it is so clearly removed from the self-image of the subject described? And further, if this value is derived from the use that the constructed identity can be put to, does it not encourage us to abandon to-truthness and opt for a pure presentism in evaluating representations?